Files
linumiq-invoice/app/services/invoice/signedUrl.ts
T
Gerhard Scheikl 01b4734477 security hardening
2026-05-31 09:35:31 +02:00

56 lines
2.0 KiB
TypeScript

import crypto from "node:crypto";
import { optionalEnv } from "../config/env.server";
/**
* Resolves the GiroCode URL signing key lazily (per call, not at module load)
* so the process can boot even when only the fallback secret is present.
*
* Prefers the dedicated `GIROCODE_SIGNING_KEY`; falls back to
* `SHOPIFY_API_SECRET` ONLY when the dedicated key is unset, so existing
* signed URLs and deployments keep working. Throws if neither is set
* (fail closed) — an empty key would make signatures forgeable.
*/
function getSigningKey(): string {
const key = optionalEnv("GIROCODE_SIGNING_KEY") ?? optionalEnv("SHOPIFY_API_SECRET");
if (!key) {
throw new Error(
"GiroCode signing key missing: set GIROCODE_SIGNING_KEY (preferred) " +
"or SHOPIFY_API_SECRET.",
);
}
return key;
}
function hmac(payload: string): string {
return crypto.createHmac("sha256", getSigningKey()).update(payload).digest("hex");
}
export interface GiroCodeUrlParams {
shop: string;
orderId: string;
exp: number; // unix seconds
}
export function signGiroCodeUrl(params: GiroCodeUrlParams): string {
const base = `shop=${params.shop}&orderId=${params.orderId}&exp=${params.exp}`;
const sig = hmac(base);
return `${base}&sig=${sig}`;
}
export function verifyGiroCodeUrl(query: URLSearchParams): { ok: boolean; shop?: string; orderId?: string; reason?: string } {
const shop = query.get("shop") || "";
const orderId = query.get("orderId") || "";
const exp = parseInt(query.get("exp") || "0", 10);
const sig = query.get("sig") || "";
if (!shop || !orderId || !exp || !sig) return { ok: false, reason: "missing-params" };
if (Date.now() / 1000 > exp) return { ok: false, reason: "expired" };
const expected = hmac(`shop=${shop}&orderId=${orderId}&exp=${exp}`);
// timing-safe compare
const a = Buffer.from(sig);
const b = Buffer.from(expected);
if (a.length !== b.length) return { ok: false, reason: "bad-sig" };
if (!crypto.timingSafeEqual(a, b)) return { ok: false, reason: "bad-sig" };
return { ok: true, shop, orderId };
}