 gerhards
|
50ab46dbe1
|
security: harden remote-access stack (pentest remediation R1-R4)
App layer (R1): bind frps NewProxy to token-owned subdomain (anti-hijack),
default-deny unknown webhook ops, HMAC-verify stripe-stub billing webhook,
enforce bandwidth quota kill-switch (Ping op), least-privilege table grants
(migrations 0002/0003), GOTRUE_PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH=12.
Infra/net (R2): unpublish internal host ports (kong/pooler/analytics/frps-dash),
read-only docker-socket-proxy for vector (no host breakout), on-demand-TLS
allow-list authorizer, edge-block machine-only webhooks, no-new-privileges on
custom containers.
Secrets (R3): rotate Postgres password (all roles) + frps dashboard; replace
predictable supavisor defaults; secrets externalized to gitignored .env.
Med/Low (R4): security response headers (HSTS/XCTO/XFO/Referrer/Permissions/COOP),
restrict frp proxy_type to http (no open relay), disable destructive redis
commands, tighten frps.toml perms.
No secrets committed; rotated values live only in gitignored .env files.
|
2026-05-30 10:45:07 +02:00 |
|