security: harden remote-access stack (pentest remediation R1-R4)

App layer (R1): bind frps NewProxy to token-owned subdomain (anti-hijack),
default-deny unknown webhook ops, HMAC-verify stripe-stub billing webhook,
enforce bandwidth quota kill-switch (Ping op), least-privilege table grants
(migrations 0002/0003), GOTRUE_PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH=12.

Infra/net (R2): unpublish internal host ports (kong/pooler/analytics/frps-dash),
read-only docker-socket-proxy for vector (no host breakout), on-demand-TLS
allow-list authorizer, edge-block machine-only webhooks, no-new-privileges on
custom containers.

Secrets (R3): rotate Postgres password (all roles) + frps dashboard; replace
predictable supavisor defaults; secrets externalized to gitignored .env.

Med/Low (R4): security response headers (HSTS/XCTO/XFO/Referrer/Permissions/COOP),
restrict frp proxy_type to http (no open relay), disable destructive redis
commands, tighten frps.toml perms.

No secrets committed; rotated values live only in gitignored .env files.

This commit is contained in:

LinumIQ Security

2026-05-30 10:45:07 +02:00

parent a8593afa61

commit 50ab46dbe1

12 changed files with 259 additions and 33 deletions

									
										caddy/docker-compose.yml
									
		+2
		
												View File
												
				@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ services:

				    image: caddy:2.10.2-alpine

				    container_name: caddy

				    restart: unless-stopped

				    security_opt:

				      - no-new-privileges:true

				    ports:

				      - "80:80"

				      - "443:443"